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SUMMARY 
 
Pensions are an important but comparatively unexamined component of human resource policies 
in education.  In an increasingly competitive world where employees are more mobile than ever, 
pension policies that were designed in the last century may be out of step with the needs of both 
individuals and schools. 
 
This background paper aims to foster understanding and informed discussion of public education 
pensions.  It describes the current system; examines concerns about funding, sustainability, 
equity, and effectiveness; and discusses pension plan structures and some options for pension 
plan redesign. 
 
Teachers (like most state and local government employees) are still covered largely by defined 
benefit pensions based on their final salaries and length of service.  Such pensions have been 
replaced in many private sector firms by defined contribution plans.  The legal and economic 
context is, however, substantially different for public and private sector pensions.  Notably, a 
sizeable minority of public sector employees are not covered by Social Security retirement 
benefits. 
 
State and local government pensions are “prefunded” to varying degrees.  While most plans 
currently have some unfunded liabilities, analysts do not foresee a broad financial crisis in the 
public pension arena.  (Retiree health care benefits, which are not the subject of this paper but 
are almost entirely unfunded, are another matter.)  Public pensions do, however, face some 
threats to their financial sustainability caused, for example, by employers’ failure to make 
actuarial required contributions and by the future stresses that other unfunded commitments such 
as retiree health care will place on state and local governments. 
 
Distinct from the question of whether teacher pension plans are financially sustainable is the 
question of how fairly they treat all teachers they serve and what if any effect they have on 
schools’ ability to find qualified staff.  While traditional defined benefit plans with their back-
loaded benefits treat long-serving teachers well, they tend to short-change individuals who do not 
work a full career in teaching or who move from state to state.  The structure of teacher pensions 
may not only be inequitable for individual teachers but can contribute to teacher shortages by 
discouraging people from moving to schools where their skills and knowledge are most needed. 
 
The debate over whether public pensions need to be redesigned has frequently taken the form of 
an argument over whether defined benefit pensions should be replace by defined contribution 
plans.  Framing the question in this way obscures the fact that the boundaries between various 
types of pensions are porous, and plans can be designed to include a variety of features 
depending on the objectives being sought.  Once these objectives are defined, various plan types 
and features can be examined with an eye on whether existing arrangements or some new 
combination would best meet those objectives.  This paper raises some questions about 
objectives for teacher pension plans that merit re-examination, offers an initial look at some of 
the options available for rethinking teacher pension design, and describes one option (the defined 
benefit cash balance plan) that to date has received little attention in the public sector.  
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Twenty-five years into the education reform era launched by the 1983 report A Nation at 
Risk, policymakers continue to search for effective ways to address the persistent challenges of 
increasing student performance and closing achievement gaps.  While much attention has been 
focused on creating standards and implementing assessment and accountability systems, there is 
a growing awareness that public policies affecting the staffing of schools also need 
reconsideration.  Many businesses have recognized the importance of adapting their human 
resource policies to attract and retain talent in a more competitive environment where workers 
are more mobile than ever before.  Public education faces the same imperative but has been 
slower to recognize that human resource policies created in the last century may no longer be 
adequate. 
 Human resource (or “human capital”) policies in education span a variety of topics.  A 
rough categorization might include: 
 
• “Pipeline” policies:  pre-service training, certification, hiring, assignment 
• In-service training policies:  mentoring, professional development, leadership 
development 
• Compensation policies:  pay, promotion, pensions 
• Policies affecting workplace conditions:  professional autonomy, principal leadership, 
student discipline, safety, condition of facilities 
 
All of these areas must be addressed if schools are to be staffed with the high quality teachers 
and principals that they need to ensure that instruction is as effective as possible.  Reformers are 
increasingly recognizing the need to develop a “strategic human capital management” approach 
to meet this challenge. 
 This paper examines one important but relatively unfamiliar element of human resource 
policy for teachers:  pensions.  Teachers (along with police officers and firefighters) were the 
first public sector employees to be covered by retirement plans.  The earliest teacher retirement 
systems were established in the second half of the 19th century.1  Today, virtually all public 
school teachers participate in public pension plans operated by state (or a few large city) 
1 
governments.  Retirement benefits are an important component of the compensation that teachers 
receive and are a significant budget item for the public sector employers who contribute to them.  
Nevertheless, pension policies are little understood by those outside education, even though 
citizens as well as educators have a strong stake in ensuring that public schools have effective 
tools for attracting and retaining high-quality employees.   
 There are several reasons to ask whether existing teacher pension policies are serving 
either teachers or the public as well as they could. The most salient issue, given widespread 
concerns about the solvency of the federal Social Security program and some public and private 
pension plans, is whether teacher pensions as currently designed are likely to be financially 
sustainable.  Less visible, but perhaps even more important, are questions about whether current 
and potential teachers are equitably and effectively served by the existing structure of retirement 
benefits and whether today’s retirement plans enhance or undermine school districts’ efforts to 
meet their staffing needs. 
 This paper is intended to foster public discussion of these issues by providing an 
overview of teacher pension plans.  The paper does not make recommendations but is intended to 
inform those who are interested in thinking about the adequacy of existing policies and about 
whether changes are needed given specific state and local needs and requirements. 
 The remainder of the paper begins in Section II with some comments about the larger 
context of discussions of teacher pensions, including the major shift in pension plan design that 
has occurred in the private sector and key differences in the legal and economic environments in 
which public and private pensions operate.  In Section III current teacher pension plans are 
described and compared.  Section IV discusses the funding and sustainability of existing plans.  
Section V examines the winners and losers under current pension designs.  Section VI concludes 
with a discussion of the growing overlap between previously distinct pension plan structures and 
presents some options for pension plan redesign. 
 So-called “other post-retirement employee benefits” are not the subject of this paper, 
although (as will be noted at several points) retiree health benefits in particular pose significant 
financial challenges for public sector employers.  These employers may find that previously 
affordable liabilities incurred in teacher pension plans will be less sustainable in the future in the 
face of their large and largely unfunded retiree health care commitments.  
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II.  THE LARGER CONTEXT:  PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS 
 
 Private and public sector employees (if they had pension coverage at all) traditionally 
participated in relatively similar kinds of pension plans.  In recent decades, however, they have 
seen their plans diverge quite dramatically.  The fact that many private employers have 
significantly altered the type of pension coverage they offer their workers is one reason why 
some observers wonder whether similar changes would be desirable in the public sector.  
  
Private and public sector pension plan types and participation 
Historically, employers who offered pension coverage did so through “defined benefit” 
plans.  In such plans, employers guarantee employees a specified annual retirement benefit based 
on a formula.  The formula was generally one of three types, as described by the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute2: 
• Flat-Benefit Formulas—These formulas pay a flat dollar amount for each year of 
service recognized under the plan. 
• Career-Average Formulas—There are two types of career-average formulas.  Under the 
first type, participants earn a percentage of the pay recognized for plan purposes in each 
year they are plan participants.  The second type of career-average formula averages the 
participant’s yearly earnings over the period of plan participation.  At retirement, the 
benefit equals a percentage of the career-average pay, multiplied by the participant’s 
number of years of service. 
• Final-Pay Formulas (also called final-average salary formulas)—These plans base 
benefits on average earnings during a specified number of years at the end of a 
participant’s career; this is presumably the time when earnings are highest.  The benefit 
equals a percentage of the participant’s final average earnings, multiplied by the number 
of years of service. 
Nonunionized private sector employees and employees in public sector jobs typically 
participated in career-average-salary or final-average-salary defined benefit (DB) plans.  
 While public sector pensions remain largely of the defined-benefit type, private sector 
pensions shifted strongly to defined contribution (DC) plans in the 1980s and 1990s.  In DC 
plans, employers contribute specified amounts (often a percentage of salary) to an individual 
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account established for participating employees.  The benefit available to the employee at 
retirement depends on the amount contributed by the employer, any contribution by the 
employee, and the investment income earned on these contributions over the years.  Usually the 
employee manages the investments in his/her individual account. The employer does not 
guarantee the employee any specific level of income in retirement.3
 In 1979, 62 percent of private sector workers who participated in an employer-based 
retirement plan had only a DB plan.  Another 22 percent had a DB plan along with a DC plan.  
Only 16 percent had only a DC plan.  By 2004, these numbers were reversed.  Only 10 percent of 
private sector workers with employer-based pensions had just a DB plan.  Twenty-seven percent 
had both DB and DC plans, while three-fifths (63 percent) had only a DC plan.4
 In addition, private sector employers sponsoring DB plans had moved away from their 
exclusive reliance on the traditional formulas for determining retirement benefits.  In 2005, a 
quarter of private sector workers who participated in DB pension plans were in redesigned plans, 
mostly so-called cash balance (CB) defined benefit plans.  These plans, which will be described 
more fully in Section VII, resemble traditional DB plans in that employers make a guarantee to 
employees (in this case, they guarantee a certain investment return) and manage retirement assets 
for all participants.  CB defined benefit plans, however also have features (such as “hypothetical” 
individual accounts) that resemble DC plans.  Table 1 shows that the percentages of private 
sector workers in DB plans using a CB formula to determine benefits was highest among white 
collar workers and workers in service producing industries.  
 Finally, it is important to note that private sector workers generally have less access to 
employer-sponsored retirement plans than do public sector workers.  Table 2 indicates that only 
70 percent of full-time workers in the private sector had access to an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan in 2007.  Only 24 percent had access to a DB plan, although almost all workers 
with access to such a plan participated in it.  While 64 percent of full-time private sector workers 
had access to a DC plan, only 50 percent participated in such a plan.  For full-time state and 
government workers, on the other hand, virtually all had access to a retirement plan and 91 
percent had access to a DB plan. 
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TABLE 1--Defined benefit plans: Primary formula, all private industry workers, 2005 
 
Characteristics Traditional plans 
Cash 
balance 
Pension 
equity 
All workers 75 23 2 
Worker characteristics    
White collar 65 33 2 
Blue collar 87 12 1 
Service 86 14 1 
Union 88 12 less than 0.5 percent 
Nonunion 68 29 3 
Establishment characteristics    
Goods producing 88 10 2 
Service producing 68 30 2 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee 
Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, 2005, Bulletin 2589, May 2007, Table 44. 
 
 
 
 
Private sector and public sector plans are embedded in different contexts 
 The big shift in private sector pensions has caused some to assume that public pensions 
ought to mirror private practice.  The private and public sectors, however, operate in two very 
different environments that must be taken into account in discussions of future public pension 
policies. 
 Most important is that a sizeable number of teachers do not participate in the retirement 
part of the Social Security program.  One estimate5 puts the proportion of teachers not covered 
by Social Security at nearly half. 
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TABLE 2--Retirement benefits: Access and participation, full-time private industry and 
state and local government workers, 2007 
 
(All full-time workers in each sector= 100 percent) 
 
Characteristics 
All private 
industry 
workers 
All state 
and local 
government 
workers 
All retirement benefits 
Access 70% 99% 
Participation 60% 95% 
Defined benefits 
Access 24% 91% 
Participation 23% 88% 
Defined contributions 
Access 64% 33% 
Participation 50% 21% 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits 
in Private Industry in the United States, March 2007, Summary 07-05, August 2007, Table 1; U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in State and Local Governments in the United States, 
September 2007, Summary 08-02, March 2008, Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Workers who do participate in Social Security have a guaranteed, inflation-adjusted 
retirement income to undergird whatever other pension and retirement savings they have.  They 
are also eligible for Social Security death and disability benefits.  Private sector employers and 
employees are required to participate in Social Security; each pays 6.2 percent of taxable 
earnings annually into the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability (OASDI) insurance program.  
Each also pays 1.45 percent of earnings into Medicare’s Hospital Insurance program. 
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Most state and local government employees hired after 1986 participate in Medicare, but 
OASDI coverage for public workers depends on individual state decisions about participation.  
Public employees were originally excluded altogether from Social Security in the 1930s because 
of constitutional questions about whether the federal government could impose taxes on state and 
local governments.  In the 1950s federal legislation allowed states voluntarily to participate in 
the program.6   
Appendix Table A-1 indicates which state (and several school district) teacher retirement 
plans participate in Social Security and which do not.  Nonparticipating states include Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, 
Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas.*  In nonparticipating states, employees’ state or local 
retirement plans must meet retirement needs that elsewhere are met jointly by Social Security 
and employer-sponsored pension plans.  Teachers without Security Security coverage must also 
look to their employer-sponsored plan for disability and survivors’ insurance if employees are to 
have access to such benefits.  Thus, employer contributions to the teacher retirement plan tend to 
be higher in nonparticipating states (but of course these employers are not paying Social Security 
taxes for the OASDI program). 
Another distinction between private and public retirement plans is whether employees as 
well as employers contribute to them.  In the private sector, employees often are not required to 
contribute to their plans (but they do have to pay Social Security taxes).  In the public sector, 
employee contributions are the norm.  Appendix Table A-1 indicates that teacher contributions 
range from nothing (in Florida and Utah) to 12 percent of earnings (in Missouri).  Many plans 
are found in the 5 to 9 percent range for required employee contributions. 
In addition, private and public pensions operate within two distinct legal and regulatory 
frameworks.  Private employers are not required to offer retirement plans, but to receive 
favorable federal tax treatment (for themselves and their employees) employers that do sponsor 
pensions must abide by the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974.  ERISA rules (which supersede any related state rules) govern reporting, 
                                                 
* In nonparticipating states, some school districts have chosen to participate in Social Security, and they and their 
employees pay OASDI taxes.  The Austin (TX) Independent School District is one such example.  States have not 
necessarily made the same decision about Social Security participation for different groups of public employees.  
For example, whereas Connecticut and Illinois teachers do not participate in Social Security, state workers do. 
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disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, eligibility, vesting, and funding.  ERISA also established the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and requires private employers to pay insurance 
premiums to this agency.7  The PBGC oversees the termination process when private employers 
decide to end a pension plan.  Normally, the employer terminating the plan pays out accumulated 
benefits either by purchasing annuities for plan beneficiaries or by making lump-sum payments.  
If the employer is in financial distress (as determined by the agency or a bankruptcy court) the 
PBGC may take over the terminated plan and pay out benefits up to federally determined limits.  
These benefits may be less than the employee had accumulated in the terminated plan.8
ERISA is frequently cited as a major reason for the shift among private employers from 
DB to DC pension plans.  ERISA increased the costs of operating DB plans in the private sector, 
through provisions such as requiring full funding of pension liabilities, imposing administrative 
costs for processes that insure compliance with ERISA rules, and mandating termination 
insurance payments to the PBGC.9   In the private sector, therefore, many employers found it 
cost effective to switch from DB to DC plans.  In the public sector, however, because ERISA 
generally does not apply, the Employee Benefit Research Institute says that the costs of 
administering a DB plan are “decidedly less” than the costs of administering a DC plan.10
State and local pension plans are exempt from most of the provisions of ERISA, although 
subnational governments must abide by certain Internal Revenue Code requirements to protect 
pension plan members from incurring tax liabilities on their pension contributions and on their 
accumulating pension benefits before retirement.  More importantly, however, state and local 
plans are governed by numerous state rules that are imbedded in state constitutions, laws, and 
regulations.  These are regarded as generally offering public employees even stronger protections 
than those enjoyed by private workers.  
A key effect of the different legal frameworks governing public sector pensions is that 
pension benefits cannot easily be reduced for current public sector employees.  “Given that 
public pensions are often legally defined as an accrued benefit earned over the life of an 
employee’s service, cutting benefit levels that have accrued to employees is often legally 
restricted.  Roughly 40 states have some form of nonimpairment clause that makes restructuring 
existing pension benefits essentially impossible.  While pension benefits can be restructured for 
future employees, it is virtually impossible to reduce them for existing workers.”11   
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Table 3 illustrates that every state has constitution clauses, statutes, or case law that 
restrict policy makers’ ability to modify public pensions.  In a state such as California where 
voter-initiated ballot propositions are permitted, citizens also have the option of directly 
determining public pension rules through the electoral process.12
Public sector employers generally cannot do as many private sector employers have done 
and terminate one kind of plan (e.g., DB) while moving current workers into a new kind of plan 
(e.g., DC).  Likewise, states may not be able to change other aspects of a current worker’s plan.  
So, for example, states may find that while they can impose higher required contribution levels 
or less-generous early retirement rules on employees hired after a certain date, they must allow 
employees hired before that date to continue under the old arrangements.  This may result either 
in public pension plans with “tiers” of contribution requirements and/or benefits, depending on 
when employees were hired, or in the existence of separate plans for earlier and later hires. 
Analysts note other differences between the private and public sectors that affect pension 
design.  While the general public may not have a strong interest in whether a particular private 
firm can attract and retain needed personnel, citizens have a more direct concern for the ability of 
government agencies that provide vital public services such as police and fire protection and 
education to fill their positions with qualified workers.13  Governments, as nonprofit entities, do 
not offer employees the same opportunities for extraordinary compensation through bonuses and 
profit sharing that private workers have.  Thus, public employers tend to emphasize secure 
retirement income in their pension plans rather than wealth accumulation, which may be a higher 
priority in private plans.14  Finally, public sector pension decisions are by definition political 
decisions.  Whereas economic forces rather than political forces are the stronger influences on 
private pensions, the reverse in true in the public sector.  Elected officials often make the key 
decisions about public plan structure and features.  Furthermore, public employees are much 
more likely to be represented by labor unions than are private sector workers; and organized 
labor plays a prominent role in debates over government retirement benefits.15
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TABLE 3—Legal restrictions on altering public employee pension benefits 
 
States with specific constitutional prohibitions against the 
impairment of public employee pensions 
                               
                           Arkansas               Michigan 
                           Hawaii                  New Hampshire 
                           Illinois                  New York 
                          
States with general constitutional prohibitions against the impairment 
of contracts (applicability to pensions depends on whether courts 
view pensions as contractual obligations; also states that do not have 
their own constitutional contract clause often rely on the contract 
clause of the U.S. Constitution) 
 
                 Arkansas             Nebraska               Rhode Island 
                 Georgia               New Jersey           Tennessee 
                 Indiana               Oklahoma              West Virginia 
 
States with statutes or case law prohibiting impairment of public 
employee pensions 
 
                  Alabama            Louisiana              Ohio 
                  Arizona              Maryland              Oregon 
                  California          Massachusetts       Pennsylvania 
                  Colorado           Maine                    South Carolina 
                  Connecticut       Minnesota             South Dakota 
                  Delaware           Mississippi           Texas 
                  District of          Missouri               Utah 
                        Columbia     Montana              Vermont                  
                  Florida               Nebraska             Virginia 
                  Idaho                  Nevada                Washington 
                  Iowa                   North Carolina    Wisconsin 
                  Kansas                North Dakota      Wyoming 
                  Kentucky 
                
 
Source:  James E. Spiotto, “If the Pension Bomb Stops Ticking, What Happens Next?” Forum on Public Pension 
Funding sponsored by the Civic Federation, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and the National Tax 
Association, 2006, accessed at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_events/files/2006_pension_spiotto.pdf  
on March 25, 2008. 
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III.  TEACHERS’ PRIMARY PENSION PLANS 
 
 In fiscal year (FY) 2005-06, state and local government employees received pension 
benefits through 221 state plans and 2,433 local ones (of which 11 were run by school districts).  
Pennsylvania had 925 retirement plans while Hawaii and Maine had only 1 each.  With about 
18.5 million members, state and local plans averaged just under 7,000 members each.16
 Many of these plans, however, serve only state and local employees other than teachers.  
Teachers participate in only a very small number of public pension plans, mostly in larger 
programs operated at the state level.  It is important that discussions of the characteristics and 
health of teacher pensions be based on the programs in which teachers actually enroll.  
Therefore, this paper draws on the Public Fund Survey, a continuously updated online 
compendium of data on 101 public retirement systems that operate 125 plans covering more than 
85 percent of the state and local public retirement system community.17  Further, we have 
identified 58 of those 125 plans in which teachers participate.  These 58 plans are listed in the 
Appendix tables and are the focus of this paper.  In the following discussion and where indicated, 
Public Fund Survey data have been augmented with data from the latest survey of educator 
pension plans conducted by the National Association of Education.18  The only relevant 
difference in plan coverage between the Public Fund and NEA surveys so far as teachers are 
concerned is that the NEA survey includes three school district pension plans (Kansas City and 
St. Louis, MO, and Omaha, NE) that are not included in the Public Fund Survey and are not 
included in the Appendix tables for the sake of comparability.  The NEA survey of 99 education 
plans includes about 40 plans that enroll non-teaching public school staff and/or higher education 
personnel, but not teachers. 
 Two clarifications are in order.  First is the distinction between retirement “system” and 
retirement “plan” as these terms are used in the Public Fund Survey.  Some systems (e.g., the 
Florida Retirement System) have just one plan within them; members from multiple types of  
public agencies are governed by the same rules concerning such things as contribution levels and 
benefits.  In other cases (e.g., Colorado) one state system (the Colorado Public Employees 
Retirement System) has several plans within it:  for example Colorado PERA includes the 
Colorado State Plan, the Colorado Municipal Plan, and the Colorado School Plan.  Plans within a 
single system cover distinct groups of employees and are discrete entities with their own rules 
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and assets and liabilities.  In yet another model, a state may have several completely separate 
public pension systems.  Thus, in California teachers belong to the California State Teachers 
Retirement System, while many other state and local employees are members of the nation’s 
largest pension system, the California Public Employees Retirement System.  These distinctions 
are useful to keep in mind when people refer to public pension systems or plans, as generalized 
statements about a system, for example, may not apply to a specific plan within the system. 
 Second, school personnel other than teachers may be in different systems or plans.  
According to the NEA survey, 8 of our 58 plans include teachers only.  The rest include various 
combinations of teachers and/or education support professionals and/or higher education faculty 
and/or higher education support professionals.  It is not uncommon for public school education 
support professionals to be in different plans than public school teachers.  Teachers in some 
states are in the same plan as other state and/or local workers.19
   
The basic design of teachers’ primary pension plans 
 In FY 2006, no state or school district required teachers to participate in a DC pension 
plan as their primary retirement benefit.   (Michigan made a DC plan the primary, exclusive 
pension for state employees in 1997, but did not include teachers in the conversion.)  In FY 2006 
most teachers participated in a traditional final-average-salary DB pension plan.  Many had the 
option of making voluntary contributions (without any employer assistance) to a separate DC 
plan for supplemental savings.  These supplemental plans are also tax advantaged under the 
Internal Revenue Code, but are not considered in this paper. 
 For teachers in traditional DB plans, their annual retirement benefits are determined by a 
formula that multiplies (1) their years of service by (2) some measure of their final salary (often 
a three-year final average) by (3) a so-called benefit factor or replacement rate (“R”).  Thus: 
 
            Annual income in first year of retirement = service (years)  X  final annual salary  X  R. 
 
For example, if a teacher retired with 30 years of service and a final average salary of $60,000 
and his/her pension plan used an “R” of 2 percent, her annual income in his/her first year of 
retirement would be $36,000.  
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 Appendix Table A-2 shows the years of service and age requirements for normal 
retirement in teacher pension plans and also the “R” benefit factors used.*
 Several states have adopted “hybrid” plans as their primary plans for teachers.  In 
Indiana, Oregon, and Washington State, some teachers (e.g., new hires after a specified date) 
participate in plans that have both a traditional final-average-salary DB and a DC component.  
Members of Washington’s Teachers Plan 3, for example, are teachers who joined the plan after 
July 1, 1996 or who chose to transfer from an older plan.  Employer contributions on teachers’ 
behalf are made to the DB plan.  Employees’ own contributions are invested in individual DC 
plan accounts.20  The “R” in the DB benefit formulas in these hybrid plans is lower than the “R” 
found in typical teacher DB programs, because part of a teacher’s retirement income is expected 
to come from his/her individual DC account.  
 In Florida, Ohio, and South Carolina, teachers have the option of choosing a DC plan as 
their primary plan rather than participating in the DB plan.21  This option is thought to be 
especially attractive to teachers who do not expect to spend a full career in teaching or in the 
same state or district, for reasons that will be discussed more extensively in Section V.   
 Alaska and West Virginia represent two special cases.   
As of July 1, 2006 all new members of the Alaska Teachers Retirement System (as well 
as other public employee newly enrolling in their own retirement system) will participate in a 
DC retirement plan.  The previous DB plan is henceforth closed to teachers.  As noted in Table 
3, Alaska is one of the states with a strong constitutional prohibition against pension reductions 
for current employees. Article XII, Section 7 states that:  “Membership in employee retirement 
systems of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. 
Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.” 22  Several other states 
have considered switching from DB to DC plans in recent years (Governor Schwarzenegger’s 
2005 proposed switch for California’s teachers and other public employees being the most 
widely publicized example),23 but to date only Alaska has made the move. 
West Virginia appears on the verge of resolving a long-running dispute that has 
complicated a 2005 decision to end a DC plan that had been the primary plan for teachers since 
                                                 
* Here and elsewhere in the paper (unless otherwise noted) when specific characteristics of pension plans are 
described, they refer to the rules in effect for current entrants into the plans.  As previously noted, for legal reasons 
pension plan changes usually cannot be applied to employees already on the job. 
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the state froze a badly underfunded DB plan in 1991.  Employees hired since 2005 enroll in the 
newly reopened DB plan.  In 2006 teachers in the DC plan voted to switch into the DB plan, but 
some DC plan participants objected to the forced conversion and sued to stop it.  The state 
legislature recently agreed to put the issue to another vote of teachers.  If at least 65 percent of 
the teachers in the retirement system approve, participants in the DC program will be able to 
move to the DB plan or stay with the DC plan.  If fewer than 65 percent vote for the new 
arrangement, the DC plan will remain the primary plan for those who entered it while the DB 
plan was closed.24  Results of the election are expected to be available in June 2008. 
 
Some distinctive features of teachers’ DB plans 
 Teachers’ DB plans have several features that are common in public sector pensions but 
that are increasingly rare in the private sector. 
 
Cost of living adjustments.  Unlike private sector pensions, public sector pensions typically 
include cost of living adjustments (COLAs) that apply once retirees begin drawing on their 
annuities.  Some are automatic and fixed (e.g., 3 percent annually, compounded).  Some are 
automatic and tied to the Consumer Price Index.  In some states, the adjustments are ad hoc 
decisions made by the retirement fund governing board or the legislature.  In a few plans COLAs 
are linked in part to the market returns on invested retirement assets.  COLA provisions for all 
the teacher plans are shown in Appendix Table A-2. 
 
Young ages for normal retirement.  As Appendix Table A-2 indicates, with just a few exceptions 
teacher retirement plans permit teachers to take “normal” retirement and receive their full 
pensions earlier than Social Security and many private sector programs.  May teacher plans 
permit normal retirement for long-serving individuals in their 50’s.  Some states use formulas 
like the “rule of 80” or “rule of 85”:  that is, teachers can retire with full benefits when the 
combination of their age and years of service equals the specified number. 
 
Early retirement benefits.  Appendix Table A-2 also shows that teachers can generally retire 
earlier than the normal retirement date and receive pension benefits.  Usually these benefits are 
reduced by some formula.  According to the National Education Association, “[e]arly retirement 
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benefits are usually computed based on the normal retirement formula, and the benefit is then 
reduced by either a specified annual percentage or by an actuarial reduction applied according to 
the number of years that the early age retirement precedes the normal age retirement.”25
                   
 
IV.  THE FUNDING AND SUSTAINABILITY OF EXISTING PENSION PLANS 
 Are teacher pensions in financial trouble?  Reports entitled “the gathering pension storm” 
facing government pensions26 and “the public pension crisis”27 suggest that they are.  “[A] bill 
coming due [for state retiree pensions and other benefits] over the next few decades that can be 
conservatively estimated at $2.73 trillion” certainly might be cause for alarm.28  Current 
unfunded public pension liabilities of more than $350 billion cause some to argue that we have 
“a national, systemic problem.”29  
 As observed earlier, however, there are thousands of public pension funds; and teachers 
belong to a relatively small number of them.  Even if their own funds are not in difficulty, 
problems elsewhere in the public sector could have an impact on them, as will be discussed later.  
More threatening in a national sense, however, are not the future liabilities in public pension 
plans (a substantial part of which are prefunded), but the enormous and almost totally unfunded 
obligations that state and local governments face for future retirees’ health care costs. 
Conclusions about whether changes are warranted in teacher pension plans depend on 
how well structured these particular plans are to meet their current and future commitments, in 
light of their own unfunded liabilities and the stresses that governments may be facing from 
other sources. 
 
The current funding status of teacher pension plans 
 Disquieting headlines or report titles aside, recent studies by credible, objective 
organizations have not found a broad crisis in the public pension arena.  The Pew Center on the 
States, author of the $2.73 trillion estimate just cited, concluded that “[f]rom a national 
perspective, states’ pension plans seem to be in reasonable shape.”30  Retiree health benefits 
were seen as much more problematic.  Likewise, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
said in late 2007 that state and local governments appeared able to fully fund their pension 
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obligations on an ongoing basis with only a small increase (0.3 percent of salaries) above their 
current contributions.31
 When a plan’s assets match its liabilities, the plan is said to be fully funded.  If the ratio 
of assets to liabilities is less than 100 percent, the plan is described as underfunded.  Some plans 
may also be overfunded, with (from an actuarial perspective) assets than are greater than those 
needed to meet the present value of current liabilities.  The Florida Retirement System, for 
example, reports a funding ratio of 105.6 and has been fully funded since 1998.  This 
accomplishment appears due at least in part to “legislation that basically reserved a portion of the 
pension surplus to serve as a safeguard against unexpected increases in liabilities, providing the 
state with extra financial security.”32
According to the Public Fund Survey, the latest available data on all 125 plans in its 
report indicate that public pension systems have $2.363 trillion in actuarial assets and $2.734 
trillion in actuarial liabilities, giving an aggregated actuarial funding ratio for all the plans of 
86.4 percent.  This is very close to the aggregated actuarial funding ratio of 85.7 percent for the 
58 teacher pension plans and to the funding ratio the Pew Center for the States found in its 
independent survey of public sector pensions which included a wider range of public employees 
and plans. 
 As Appendix Table A-2 shows, however, funding ratios in teacher pension plans vary 
widely, with West Virginia’s just re-opened plan having a funding ratio of only 31.9 percent and 
several plans being nearly fully funded or even over funded in actuarial terms.  Table 4 
summarizes the ratios found across the plans. 
 Actuarial funding ratios are useful indicators, but they must be interpreted with caution.  
They are statements at a particular time about how the assets in a pension plan compare to the 
present value of the benefits that plan members have accrued.  Ratios do not indicate anything 
about whether a plan is moving in a healthy or unhealthy direction.  If a plan is amortizing 
previous unfunded liabilities, for example, it may appear at a given point to have a large 
unfunded liability; but in fact its funding ratio might be on target with a planned schedule for 
achieving financial soundness.  Since unfunded liabilities are typically amortized over 30 years, 
the key question for an underfunded plan is whether it is making progress in reducing its 
unfunded liabilities. 
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TABLE 4—Actuarial funding ratios for teacher pension plans 
 
Funding  Number of plans 
Plan funded at 100% or more 8 
Plan funded at 90% – 99% 9 
Plan funded at 80% to 89% 15 
Plan funded at 70% to 79% 10 
Plan funded at 60% - 69% 12 
Plan funded below 60% 4 
 
Source: The Public Fund Survey, http://www.publicfundsurvey.org (accessed March 27, 2008).  Most but 
not all data are for FY 2006. 
 
 
Moreover, funding ratios are not strictly comparable from plan to plan.  How a specific 
ratio is calculated depends on a variety of rules used by actuaries to determine such things as the 
cost method, future investment returns, and the asset valuation method.  Appendix Table A-3 
illustrates the variation in a few of the basic assumptions employed in calculating teacher 
pension plan liabilities.  Calculations about a plan’s financial strength can be quite sensitive to 
the assumptions made about the future rate of return on invested pension funds, and this becomes 
increasingly true as a plan matures.*  GAO, for example, determined that public pension plans at 
current contribution levels (9.0 percent of salaries) would need to be raised only to 9.3 percent of 
salaries for employers to be able to meet their future obligations, if investment returns followed 
past patterns.  If the future real rate of return is 1 percentage point higher or 2 percentage point 
lower than the historic rate, however, annual contribution levels would have to be 5.0 percent of 
salaries or 13.9 percent of salaries, respectively.33
                                                 
* The assets available to pay promised pension benefits to retirees consist of contributions from employers and 
employees (which are relatively predictable) plus investment returns on these assets minus plan expenses.  As a 
pension plan matures, the proportion of its annual income that comes from investment returns becomes larger 
relative to the annual contributions made on behalf of plan members.  Thus assumptions about investment returns 
have an increasing impact on calculations about the plan’s ability to meet its obligations. 
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Finally, questions are growing within the pension community about whether a wholly 
new approach, based on concepts from the field of financial economics, is needed to measure 
accurately the funded status of public pension plans.  While a fuller discussion is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is worth taking note of the controversy and pointing out that “mark to 
market” rather than standard actuarial methods for valuing assets and liabilities appear likely to 
indicate that current liabilities are understated and that higher current contribution rates are 
called for. 
 With these caveats in mind, though, reported funding ratios can be used to begin 
examining whether pension plans will be able to fulfill their promises about retirement benefits.   
The opinions cited above that many public pensions are adequately funded are based on the fact 
that many plans (including many of the larger ones) report funding ratios of at least 80 percent.  
As GAO noted, “A funded ratio of 80 percent or more is within the range that many public sector 
experts, union officials, and advocates view as a healthy pension system.”34  Full funding is not 
considered as important for public pensions as it for private pensions (where full funding is 
required by ERISA) because governments have taxing authority and can only in extreme cases 
declare bankruptcy.  Nevertheless, the point-in-time snapshot for our 58 teacher plans indicates 
that 26 fall below the 80 percent threshold.  The data, it should be noted, were reported before 
the financial market turmoil that began in late 2007. 
 The author of the Public Fund Survey suggests that: 
Underfunding is a matter of degree, not of kind.  That is, underfunding is not necessarily 
a sign of fiscal or actuarial distress; many pension plans remain underfunded for decades 
with no detrimental consequences…. 
 
The critical factor in assessing the current and future health of a pension plan is not so 
much the plan’s actuarial funding level, as whether or not funding the plan’s liabilities 
creates fiscal stress for the pension plan sponsor [emphasis in original].35
   
 This idea of viewing the health of a teacher pension plan through the lens of the stress it 
currently or potentially poses for the plan sponsor seems like a very constructive starting point 
for evaluating individual plans.  It reflects the fact that sustainability will depend on a number of 
factors outside of the pension plan itself, many of which will be specific to an individual sponsor 
(such as what is happening to the tax base in a particular jurisdiction and how population 
changes may be affecting the demand for public services of various kinds). 
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 In addition, however, there are some general pressures that could pose challenges to 
financial sustainability for many plans. 
 
Threats to financial sustainability 
 Public pension plans generally and teacher plans specifically are vulnerable to some 
common threats that often receive insufficient attention from public officials responsible for 
pension policies. 
 
Employers’ failure to make actuarial required contributions.  To maintain or reach full funding in 
a pension program, the sponsor must annually make its actuarial required contribution (ARC).  
This consists of “the amount of funding needed to pay for new liabilities accrued in that year 
[“normal cost”] as well as to pay off a portion of the unfunded liabilities accrued in previous 
years.”36  State and local governments frequently fail to make these contributions in full.  The 
Pew Center recently estimated that among the states there was about a 50-50 split between those 
making their funding requirements and those failing to do so.37  Not only do pension plans with 
unfunded liabilities fall even further behind in years when they do not pay ARCs, but these 
missed payments can create a financial drag on the pension plan for many years to come.   
 Illinois, for example, is reported to have the largest unfunded pension obligation in the 
nation for its five state employment plans, one of which covers teachers.  The Center for Tax and 
Budget Accountability reports that the practice of failing to meet even the normal cost for the 
pension plans dates back over 35 years.  Despite some efforts to reduce liabilities, the state took 
so-called pension holidays in FY 2006 and 2007 to avoid fully meeting its pension obligations.38  
Such holidays are not uncommon, especially when states or cities are under fiscal pressure from 
other spending demands and tax revenues fail to keep up.  In Illinois, the compounding problem 
of repeated failures to fully fund pensions puts the state in ever-deeper financial peril, since it is 
one of the states with a constitutional prohibition against diminishing or impairing pension 
benefits under an enforceable contractual relationship between pension plan participants and the 
government.  
 The Wisconsin Retirement System has some unusual protections against underfunding.  
The consulting actuary, with approval of a board of trustees, sets contribution levels.  In other 
states, legislatures often have this responsibility.  If local governments do not pay their share, the 
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state will deduct what they owe from state aid programs.  Moreover, retirees receive COLAs 
only when investment returns are sufficient to pay them, and COLAs can be taken back if 
investment returns are negative.39
 
Unfunded “benefit bumps.”  As previously noted, public pension plan policies are made in a 
highly politicized environment.  One result is a penchant among lawmakers to increase pension 
benefits, especially when economic times are good and investment returns are outpacing 
immediate needs.  Too often, however, these decisions are made without sufficient attention to 
their effect on the pension plan “bottom line” over the long term.    
For example, the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research reports40 that in 2000 the 
Massachusetts legislature passed “a massive enhancement of benefits for teachers.”  The 
contribution rate for new teachers was increased and benefits were raised for long-time teachers.  
At retirement, the pensions of teachers with 30 or more years of service would be increased by 2 
percent per year for each year of service in excess of 24.  Teachers already in the system could 
opt into the new arrangements by paying the higher contribution rate.  The buy-in rules for 
teachers nearing retirement were generous.  The Pioneer Institute shows how a 30-year veteran 
with 30 years of service could increase his/her expected lifetime annuity payments by $165,000 
for a buy-in cost of $18,000.    
 This is only one of many “benefit bumps” in public pension programs around the 
country. 
 Some states have taken action designed to force costs as well as benefits to be considered 
when pension benefit increases are being debated.  Georgia’s state constitution requires that 
public retirement plans remain actuarially sound.  To accomplish this, the state requires that 
pension legislation with a fiscal effect can be introduced only in the first year of the General 
Assembly’s two year term and can be passed only in the second year (and these actions have to 
take place in regular, not special, sessions).  Such legislation cannot be considered by the full 
House or Senate unless its actuarial cost has been determined.  Retirement bills become null and 
void if their first-year funding costs are not appropriated in the year of enactment.  Finally, the 
state is required to contribute its ARC (i.e., both normal cost and the amount necessary to 
amortize any unfunded liability).41  Oklahoma has similar requirements.  Missouri does not 
allow public pension plans to increase benefits if the plan is less than 80 percent funded.   
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 “Gaming” the system to increase pension benefits.  DB pension benefits that are based on final 
average salaries are vulnerable to “gaming” in order to increase pension benefits.  Some 
examples involving teachers have to do with teachers in non-Social Security states exploiting 
loopholes in order to qualify for spousal Social Security benefits for which they would otherwise 
be ineligible.  It is unclear how much “spiking” (inflating end-of-career salaries) goes on in 
teaching, but the phenomenon is generally acknowledged as a concern in public pension systems.   
One way individuals can “spike” is to move into higher paying jobs in the years that count for 
pension determination.  In North Carolina, for example, researchers heard about teachers who 
move from low-paying to high-paying counties for the last few years of their careers to qualify 
for higher benefits under the state retirement system.42   
 Some states have enacted laws to circumvent spiking in public pension systems.  
Missouri, for example, limits (with some exceptions) the maximum annual percentage increase 
that will be counted for pension purposes in the final salary period to 10 percent.  Illinois also 
caps end-of-career salary increases. 
 
Stresses from non-pension unfunded commitments.  How burdensome pension liabilities will be 
for states and local governments depends on other unfunded commitments.  The “600 pound 
gorilla” here is retiree health care.  As the recent Pew Center for the States report43 demonstrates, 
unfunded liabilities for retiree health care costs are finally being tallied up thanks to new 
reporting requirements from the Government Accounting Standards Board.  Most governments 
are just realizing for the first time how large these liabilities are.  While governments can change 
health care commitments much more easily than pension commitments, the political costs of 
reducing expected benefits will be high.  The financial stresses imposed by these non-pension 
obligations seem certain to cast a shadow over discussions of pension policy as well. 
 
 
V. WHO BENEFITS AND WHO LOSES UNDER CURRENT PENSION 
DESIGN? 
Distinct from the question of whether teacher pension plans are financially sustainable is the 
question about how fairly they treat all the teachers they serve and what if any effect they have 
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on schools’ ability to find qualified staff.  The almost universal adherence of public pension 
plans to the final-average-salary DB design is frequently justified on the grounds that it is 
desirable to have a long-term, stable public workforce to serve community needs and that it is 
important to ensure loyal career employees that they will have a secure source of income once 
they retire.  The back-loaded benefits embedded in the traditional final-average-salary DB 
formula are designed to meet these objectives for long-serving teachers.  What is increasingly 
unclear, however, is how well the traditional design serves the teaching force as a whole, 
especially those teachers who do not teach for 25 or 30 years or who do not remain in the same 
location throughout their careers.  In a 21st century world where employee mobility is 
increasingly a feature of modern economic life (and where many young adults expect to hold 
multiple jobs during their lifetimes), the question of how well the current pension system serves 
all teachers merits re-examination. 
 
Back-loaded benefits:  how pension wealth accumulates over a teacher’s career 
 Participants in traditional final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans do not accrue 
benefits evenly over their careers.  One way to show this is to measure the growth in a teacher’s 
pension wealth over his/her career, as Costrell and Podgursky have done in Figure 1 for an 
illustrative teacher in the Ohio retirement system.  Pension wealth is a measure of the present 
value of a stream of pension payments or the market value of an equivalent annuity.  In the 
example of the Ohio teacher, pension wealth accumulates very slowly for 20 or so years and then 
rises rapidly.  Although the exact shape of the wealth curve reflects specific features of the Ohio 
plan, the overall shape is characteristic of traditional DB plans.  One crucial feature to note is 
that pension wealth can actually begin to decline in a traditional DB plan if the teacher stays on 
the job long enough.  This occurs because at some point the additional pension wealth 
accumulated for an additional year of teaching is not sufficient to offset the loss of income the 
teacher experiences by shortening by one year the time s/he can be expected to receive pension 
income in retirement. 
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FIGURE 1—Pension wealth in dollars 
 
 
Source:  Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, Golden Peaks and Perilous Cliffs: Rethinking Ohio’s Teacher 
Pension System, Washington, DC:  Thomas B. Fordham Institute, June 2007. 
 
 
 Even though in this example pension wealth rises throughout most of a long career, the 
annual increase in pension wealth net of the earnings on the previous year’s wealth (“deferred 
compensation”) changes in idiosyncratic ways compared to annual salary (“current 
compensation”) late in a teacher’s career.  Costrell and Podgursky also show this phenomenon 
for the illustrative Ohio teacher in Figure 2.  The “peaks and cliffs” portrayed in this figure occur 
because of the way early and normal retirement provisions operate.   Again, this particular 
pattern is illustrative of Ohio’s pensions, but similar peaks and cliffs are found in other state 
plans. 
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FIGURE 2—annual deferred income, as percentage of earnings 
                  (age of first pension draw indicated) 
 
 
Source:  Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, Golden Peaks and Perilous Cliffs: Rethinking Ohio’s Teacher 
Pension System, Washington, DC:  Thomas B. Fordham Institute, June 2007. 
 
 
 
How “short termers” fare under traditional DB pension plans 
  In general, and despite their idiosyncrasies, the structure of the traditional DB plans 
treats teachers well if they work a full career in teaching.   For those who do not, however, the 
benefits are much less generous.  These individuals are less well served than they would be 
under a pension framework (such as a DC plan) that accumulated benefits more evenly 
throughout a teaching career. 
 A teacher who leaves his or her job short of a full career generally can (and sometimes 
must) remain in a DB plan as an “inactive” member and receive a pension later at retirement age.  
The pension formula used to calculate the retirement benefit, however, will reflect the final 
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average salary at the time the teacher left the system.  Since this could have been many years 
earlier, inflation will have taken a severe toll on the benefit level. 
 Some plans allow a departing teacher to cash-out the retirement benefit in some way.  
Seldom, however, will this teacher receive full credit for his or her own contributions, the 
employer contribution, and a market rate of return on these investments.  Generally, a teacher 
withdrawing from a pension plan will lose all of the employer contributions made on his or her 
behalf.  A few states have modified their plans to be more generous to departing employees.  In 
South Dakota, for example, teachers leaving after three years of credited service but before 
retirement can select a “portable retirement option” which allows them to take with them their 
accumulated contributions (both employee and employer shares) and credited interest.  The 
Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association allows a departing teacher (before 
retirement or age 65) to receive his or her own accumulated contributions (including interest at a 
5 percent rate) plus a 50 percent “match” that gives the employee at least partial credit for the 
employer’s contribution.   
 The typical teacher pension plan can exact a toll on individuals who are geographically 
mobile.  Since there is virtually no cross-state reciprocity in teacher pensions (and sometimes 
limited reciprocity between local and state systems within the same state), a teacher could work 
for a full career in a succession of jobs in different states and never receive anything near the 
pension benefits he or she would have earned by staying in the same place.  Long vesting periods 
(in some states as long as ten years) can further penalize a mobile teacher who may leave before 
becoming vested. 
 “Purchase of service credit” provisions exist in virtually all teacher pension plans and in 
theory compensate for some of these disadvantages.  The provisions are cumbersome and 
limited, however, and differ from plan to plan.  A mobile teacher who cashes out of one plan 
without receiving full credit for all employer and employee contributions and interest may not 
have enough money to pay the price of purchasing credit in the new system.  An individual who 
enters teaching in mid-career and whose prior service was not in teaching or public employment 
may not be allowed to purchase credits.  This person may be doubly disadvantaged, because he 
or she may not be given much if any credit on the “salary scale” for work in another field, so the 
final pension benefit will reflect both a limited number of years of service and a lower salary 
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than a long-term teacher of the same age would have.  For all new entrants to a pension plan, the 
number of years of prior service credits than can be purchased is likely to be restricted. 
 Fairly limited attention has been paid to pension penalties incurred by “short termers” 
because teachers have generally been perceived as spending their careers “close to home.”  There 
is little empirical evidence available to date on the proportion of teachers who may suffer 
financial penalties from moving across state lines or from having shorter working lives because 
they “stop out” for a while for family or other personal reasons.  A cursory look at financial 
reports from several state pension plans suggests, however, that a significant minority of their 
current retirees left the workforce with fewer than the 20 to 25 years of service that would 
qualify them for the good benefits that a back-loaded DB system provides a long-serving 
individual.   There is also no way to measure the extent to which teachers are locked into their 
current jobs because of the financial price they would pay if they left their current pension plan.  
Superintendents, who often have careers spanning several states, have long been aware of the 
pension cost that mobility imposes. 
 
How pension plan design can contribute to teacher shortages  
 The back-loaded and “spiky” pension benefits described above may not only be 
inequitable for individual teachers but can make schools “losers” under current pension plans as 
well because these plans may contribute to teacher shortages.  The penalties paid by “short-term” 
teachers discourage individuals from moving from areas where their skills may be in surplus to 
areas which may be suffering from difficulties in filling their teaching slots.  As we have just 
seen, these penalties can also serve as a disincentive to individuals who might want to spend a 
significant time as teachers but who do not see teaching as their single lifetime career.   
Provisions for early retirement and pension provisions that (perhaps unintentionally) 
create financial incentives for teachers to retire at specific times in their careers may also induce 
these individuals to leave their jobs even though the resulting vacancy may be difficult to fill.  
The 2000 Massachusetts pension changes mentioned earlier were associated with about an 80 
percent increase in the number of retirements in the first year that teachers could receive the new, 
higher benefits.  The increase in retirement levels above those experienced before the 2000 
reforms has continued in subsequent years.44  
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 VI.  RETHINKING TEACHER PENSION PLAN DESIGN 
 
 The debate over whether public pensions need to be redesigned has frequently taken the 
form of an argument over whether defined benefit pensions should be replaced, as they largely 
have been in the private sector, by defined contribution plans. Moreover, the argument is, as the 
authors of a TIAA Institute report note, often characterized by “heated rhetoric—but little light.”  
They observe that: 
Public policy makers are often bombarded with emotion-laden arguments as to the 
relative merits of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plan designs.  The 
“DB vs. DC debate often includes strong and heated rhetoric from both sides…. 
 
Those who favor defined benefit plans have sometimes characterized defined 
contribution alternatives as “risky 401(k) plans” while those who favor defined 
contribution plans have, in turn, sometimes characterized DB plans as akin to welfare for 
public employees.45
 
Framing the debate as “DB vs. DC” obscures some important points.  First is that each 
type of plan has advantages and disadvantages for employers and employees.  Second is that the 
two types of plans are not as distinctive as they may at first appear.  Many features that might 
justify a switch to a DC plan can also be built into a DB plan, and some DB-type features can 
also be added to DC plans.  Finally, arguing in terms of the classic designs of traditional DB and 
DC plans fails to bring into the discussion new types of plans, such as the cash balance (CB) 
defined benefit plan.  CB defined benefit plans can be designed with features that might address 
key interests of partisans on both sides of the DB/DC divide.  The CB defined benefit alternative, 
which has been adopted by a number of private sector employers, has been used infrequently in 
the public sector.  It is thus relatively unfamiliar to participants in public sector pension debates.  
Therefore, the final section of the paper will explain how this kind of plan works and why policy 
makers might want to consider it among the various options for pension plan redesign. 
 
“DB vs. DC”:  the familiar arguments for and against 
  Table 5 lays out some of the key features of traditional DB and DC plans.  Many of the  
familiar arguments for and against DB or DC pensions are rooted in the differences described in 
the table.  Which features are seen as advantageous or disadvantageous depend on where one 
sits.  Employers, for example, may welcome the fact that traditional DB plans provide their 
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Table 5: Characteristics of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension Plans 
 
Characteristic Defined Benefit Defined Contribution 
Determined in 
advance Pension benefit Pension contribution 
Contributions are tax 
deferred Yes Yes 
Encourages longer 
tenure Yes No 
Portability Limited Full 
Cost of living 
adjustments (COLAs) Common Uncommon 
Typical vesting period 5 years 0 - 2 years 
Timing of pension 
wealth accruals Mostly late in career Smooth accrual 
Effect of salary 
changes 
Affect past and future 
benefits 
Affect future 
contributions 
Control over 
investments Plan sponsor Employee 
Form of pension 
benefit Annuity Lump sum 
 
Source: Partially based on Leora Friedberg and Michael T. Owyang, “Not Your Father’s Pension Plan: The Rise of 
401(k) and other Defined Contribution Plans,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 84, no. 1 
(January/February 2002): Table 1; National Conference of State Legislatures, “Defined Benefit and Defined 
Contribution Retirement Plans,” available at <http://204.131.235.67/programs/fiscal/defineretire.htm> accessed on 
March 31, 2008.  
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 employees with benefits that cannot be outlived.  Employers and employees may appreciate the 
fact that on average DB fund managers are likely to be able to achieve higher investment returns 
at lower costs than individuals can obtain on their own in managing DC accounts.  Employers 
and taxpayers may question, however, whether benefits such as early retirement and inflation-
protected pensions can be provided at contribution levels they are willing to support.  Many 
employees may like the guaranteed lifetime income of a DB plan, but some may wish for more 
direct control over their investments or prefer more freedom to take lump-sum payouts rather 
than the traditional DB annuity.  As we have already seen, long-term employees are likelier than 
their shorter-term colleagues to prefer DB over DC plans.  Public citizens, who pay for the 
employer share of pension contributions, will have different views on such issues as whether it is 
appropriate for public sector workers to have more generous pension benefits than many 
taxpayers now enjoy. 
While Table 5 is a common way of contrasting traditional DB and DC plans, a different 
and useful perspective is provided by Crane et al. in their TIAA Institute study.  They compare 
the plans specifically through the lens of who bears the risks in each type of plan.  As Crane et 
al.46 describe them, risks include: 
Investment and Funding Rate Risk 
 
Investment risk—the risk that investment returns will be less than necessary to provide the desired 
benefit levels. 
 
Funding rate risk—the risk that plan investment or benefits experience is worse than expected 
requiring higher contributions to properly pay for the promised or desired benefits. 
 
Longevity and Inflation Risk 
 
Longevity risk—the risk that the participant will live longer than expected. 
 
Inflation risk—the risk that inflation will decrease the value of the earned benefit. 
 
Mortality and Disability Risk 
 
Mortality risk—the risk that the participant will die before expected. 
 
Disability risk—the risk that the participant will become disabled before  
becoming eligible for regular retirement benefits. 
 
Termination Risk—the risk that the participant will end employment before vesting and forfeit accrued 
benefits. 
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Table 6: Retirement Plan Risk Allocation 
 
 
* Many public defined benefit plans provide some level of inflation protection benefit for retirees, but rarely do so 
for participants who leave covered employment with deferred vested benefits to be paid in the future. 
Who Bears the Risk 
Risk Area 
DB DC 
Investment Plan Sponsor Participant 
Funding Rate Plan Sponsor Participant 
Mortality Plan Sponsor Participant 
Longevity Plan Sponsor Participant 
Inflation Participant* Participant 
Termination Participant* Participant 
Annuitization Plan Sponsor Participant 
Disability Plan Sponsor Participant 
 
Source: Roderick B. Crane, Michael Heller, and Paul Yakoboski, Designing Public-Sector Pensions for the 21st 
Century: A Risk Management Approach, TIAA-CREF Institute (Date Unknown), available at <http://www.tiaa-
crefinstitute.org/research/articles/docs/DesigningPublicSectorPensions.pdf> accessed on March 31, 2008: Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows how these risks are divided among plan sponsors and participants intraditional DB 
and DC plans.  This way of comparing plan types brings to the forefront the fact that plan 
sponsors bear most of the risks in DB plans, whereas plan participants bear most of the risks in 
DC plans.  The uneven division of risk underlies a lot of specific objections to the two traditional 
types of public pension plans.  It also helps explain the opposition of affected parties when 
proposed pension changes threaten to shift to them risks that they previously did not have to 
bear.   
 
Why DB/DC distinctions are not as clearcut as generally perceived 
 It is customary for discussions of DB and DC pensions to draw a bright line between the 
two plan designs, as the last section does in describing characteristics of the traditional form of 
each pension type.  But discussions of possible pension reforms also should consider that both 
types of plans can be modified to include features that embrace desirable elements of the other. 
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 A few examples47 indicate how this could be accomplished, depending on what specific 
concerns are being addressed.  We have already seen how some states have modified their DB 
plans to work in tandem with a DC plan so that employees can enjoy the benefits of both and 
employers and employees can more evenly share pension risks.  One of those states, 
Washington, has also tackled the concern that DC plan investors may suffer from lower 
investment returns because they do not have the bargaining clout of a big pension fund and do 
not have the same investment options (such as real estate, private equity, and hedge funds) that 
institutional investors do.  Investors in Washington’s Plan 3 DC account can choose to invest 
their funds in a total allocation portfolio (TAP) that is continuously managed and rebalanced by 
the Washington State Investment Board.  TAP mirrors the investments in the state’s DB plan. 
 DC plans can also be structured to include death and disability benefits of a kind 
traditionally found only in DB plans.  In Florida, employers pay a separate surcharge that enables 
the state to give DC plan participants who become disabled the option of surrendering their DC 
account balances and receiving the same disability benefits as offered in the DB plan.  Alaska 
has built benefits for occupational death and disability into its new primary DC plan. 
 Traditional final-average-salary DB plans can also be redesigned to have some DC-type 
features.  The Wisconsin Retirement System allows DB plan participants to put 50 percent of 
their and their employer’s contributions into a Variable Trust Fund, giving them some control 
over investments but subjecting them to some investment risk.  In some DB plans, beneficiaries 
are now offered the opportunity at retirement to take a lump-sum distributions rather than being 
required to take a life-time annuity.  Teachers in Colorado’s state pension plan, for example, are 
credited with a fixed interest rate (currently 5 percent compounded annually) on their own  
contributions.  If an individual chooses to withdraw his/her account after retirement eligibility or 
age 65 rather than take an annuity, s/he receives the amount credited to his/her account along 
with a 100 percent match (effectively accounting for the employer’s contribution as well).   
The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) assessed Governor Schwarzenegger’s 
proposal to shift the state’s public employees from a DB to a DC plan and made a number of 
suggestions for ways in which concerns raised by the governor could be addressed within the 
structure of the DB program.48  For example, the LAO indicated that concerns about benefits 
could be addressed by such steps as closing some formulas to new entrants, moving from a final 
year salary to a final-average salary with a three-year instead of a one-year base for calculating 
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pensions, and restricting retroactive benefit enhancements.  Funding concerns could be addressed 
by setting aside funds in years when investment returns are better than expected to cover years 
when returns were below expectations, making employee contributions variable (as employer 
contributions are), and reasserting statutory rights to change employee contributions.  The LAO 
also raised the possibility that the state might want to consider making its primary pension plan a 
cash balance defined benefit plan instead of the existing final-year salary DB plan. 
 
Cash balance plans:  the road seldom taken (in the public sector) 
 Cash balance plans are interesting because they are legally treated as defined benefit 
programs.  They have certain characteristics in common with DB programs (including 
guarantees about retirement income benefits); but they also have characteristics of DC programs.  
Generally described as a “hybrid” pension design, CB plans share many of the risks in pension 
plans between employers and employees.  DB and DC plans, by contrast, place various kinds of 
risks exclusively on one or the other party. 
 As indicated earlier, private employers who continue to sponsor defined benefit pensions 
have moved nearly a quarter of their workers into cash balance plans.  In the public sector, 
however, we could find only two such plans.  California has a cash balance plan, administered by 
the California State Teachers Retirement system, for part-time teachers.  Nebraska has 
implemented a CB plan for its state and local employees, though not for teachers.  Nebraska’s 
state and local employees were in a DC plan from 1964 to 2003.  Investment returns in the DC 
lagged those in the state’s other DB programs over that period.  About half of the DC 
participants were in the default investment fund, a low-risk but comparatively low-yield stable 
value fund.  Partially because of this, DC participants were receiving significantly less 
replacement income in retirement than had been projected.  Nebraska made a new cash balance 
plan the primary pension plan for state and local employees hired on or after January 1, 2003.49
 One reason for the slow spread of cash balance plans into the public sector may be that, 
after an initial burst of interest in them in the private sector, legal questions arose that effectively 
stopped their implementation for a number of years.  These issues appear to be largely resolved 
now.  As will be described below, some early features that were unpopular with employees are 
no longer legal.  The question of whether CB plans constitute age discrimination seems to have 
been put to rest.  Implementation of CB plans by a number of private employers has shown that 
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these plans can be structured in ways that benefit younger workers while not harming older 
workers who expected back-end-loaded benefits based on their long service. 
 
What are cash balance defined benefit pensions?  The U.S. Department of Labor defines cash 
balance plans as follows:50
 
A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that defines the benefit in terms that are 
more characteristic of a defined contribution plan. In other words, a cash balance plan 
defines the promised benefit in terms of a stated account balance…. 
 
In a typical cash balance plan, a participant's account is credited each year with a pay 
credit (such as 5 percent of compensation from his or her employer) and an interest credit 
(either a fixed rate or a variable rate that is linked to an index such as the one-year 
Treasury bill rate). Increases and decreases in the value of the plan's investments do not 
directly affect the benefit amounts promised to participants. Thus, the investment risks 
and rewards on plan assets are borne solely by the employer. 
 
When a participant becomes entitled to receive benefits under a cash balance plan, the 
benefits that are received are defined in terms of an account balance. For example, 
assume that a participant has an account balance of $100,000 when he or she reaches age 
65. If the participant decides to retire at that time, he or she would have the right to an 
annuity. Such an annuity might be approximately $10,000 per year for life. In many cash 
balance plans, however, the participant could instead choose (with consent from his or 
her spouse) to take a lump sum benefit equal to the $100,000 account balance. 
 
In addition to generally permitting participants to take their benefits as lump sum benefits 
at retirement, cash balance plans often permit vested participants to choose (with consent 
from their spouses) to receive their accrued benefits in lump sums if they terminate 
employment prior to retirement age. 
Traditional defined benefit pension plans do not offer this feature as frequently…. 
If a participant receives a lump sum distribution, that distribution generally can be rolled 
over into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or to another employer's plan if that 
plan accepts rollovers…. 
While both traditional defined benefit plans and cash balance plans are required to offer 
payment of an employee’s benefit in the form of a series of payments for life, traditional 
defined benefit plans define an employee's benefit as a series of monthly payments for 
life to begin at retirement, but cash balance plans define the benefit in terms of a stated 
account balance. These accounts are often referred to as hypothetical accounts because 
they do not reflect actual contributions to an account or actual gains and losses allocable 
to the account. 
 
Like traditional defined benefit pensions, cash balance pensions in private firms are insured by 
the PBGC. 
 
 
Why CB plans may appeal to some employers and employees.  Cash balance plans look in some 
ways like DC plans to workers but are funded, administered, and regulated as defined benefit 
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plans.51  Private firms had some tax incentives to convert from traditional DB plans to CB plans 
rather than to DC plans, but research suggests that firms that operated in tight labor markets with 
younger, more mobile workers were more strongly motivated by a desire to serve the needs of 
their employees.52  CB plans do not penalize worker mobility yet do not force workers to take on 
the investment risk associated with managing their own investment accounts.  CB plans do not 
remove all investment risk from employers, especially for plans that guarantee a fixed interest 
credit; but the risks are much less than with traditional DB plans.  With CB plans, employers do 
not have to worry that employees will unwisely choose not to participate.  They also find that 
employees understand CB plans better than they understand traditional DB plans and therefore 
give the employer more credit for providing the retirement benefit.53  Employers, increasingly 
concerned about how to attract and/or retain older workers, also tend to appreciate the fact that 
CB plans do not penalize older employees who work beyond normal retirement age and do not 
create incentives for early retirement.54   
 
Objections to CB plans.  The editors of a special journal issue devoted to hybrid pensions in the 
United States introduced the volume by saying: 
 
…hybrid pensions have proven very controversial in the United States. At least some of 
the controversy is not about hybrid designs per se but about the process of converting 
from a defined benefit to a hybrid plan and whether the legislation adequately protects 
workers in the conversion process. In addition, hybrids are a relatively new form of 
provision and it has proven challenging to handle hybrid pensions within the existing 
U.S. regulatory framework. Further, it is clear to us that understanding of the features of 
hybrids is not as advanced as for more traditional forms of benefit provision.55
 
Older workers in companies that were converting from DB to CB plans had a number of 
concerns.  Some employees objected to the loss of early retirement benefits, since early 
retirement incentives are not generally part of CB plans.  Some objected to being moved into a 
plan that provided similar benefits to workers of all ages (e.g., similar employer contribution 
rates) as they were nearing the point in their careers when their pension wealth would have 
started to grow significantly under a traditional back-loaded defined benefit plan.  In some 
companies, the value of older workers’ transition accounts were calculated in such a way that the 
worker would not be eligible for new employer contributions for some period of time (a situation 
called “wear away”).  Congress held hearings and considered bills to stop conversions.  A 
number of lawsuits were filed against employers attempting to stop CB plans on a number of 
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grounds, including age discrimination.  A trial court in a case against IBM ruled in 2003 that 
cash balance plans inherently and illegally discriminated on the basis of age.  The age 
discrimination ruling was, however, overruled by an appellate court in 2006; and in 2007 the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear arguments challenging that decision. 
 Amid the controversy, however, the Internal Revenue Service in 1999 stopped approving 
new cash balance plans, approval which is required in order to protect the tax-advantaged status 
of these plans.  Companies that had already adopted such plans were free to continue them but 
lived in the shadow of what the courts and Congress might decide about age discrimination and 
other issues. 
 In 2006 Congress passed the Pension Protection Act, which resolved a number of 
outstanding issues about cash balance plans created after June 30, 2005.  Among other things, it 
prohibits “wear away” in new plans and makes it clear that these new plans will not be subject to 
age-discrimination challenges as long as they include certain features.  
 The controversies that have arisen with regard to private sector CB plans seem, in any 
event, less likely to apply to public sector plans.  Because, as previously noted, state 
constitutions and statutes make it difficult to change public pension benefits for current workers, 
states are not as likely as private firms to consider converting their existing employees from one 
type of pension plan to another.  Governments, however, can and arguably should consider 
whether a different pension structure for future workers would be desirable. 
 There has been some research on the cost of CB defined benefit plans vs. traditional 
final-average-salary DB plans.  One study of firms that had converted to CB as of 1998 
concluded that pension liabilities for the majority increased.  The authors note that this would not 
have been the case if benefits were held to the amounts employees had a legal claim to; so they 
concluded that employers increased benefits during the conversion.56  This might have been 
done, for example, to compensate older workers for some of the future benefits they would have 
received under the old DB plan.  Another study determined that the costs of grandfathering older 
workers’ benefits can be substantial.57  Whether or not pension costs increase for employers 
under a CB plan, however, costs become more predictable because the percentage of salary the 
employer is required to contribute is known and the rate of return the employer must credit to the 
employees’ hypothetical accounts is tied to market rates. 
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Conclusion 
 A number of years ago an ERISA Advisory Council working group on hybrid pensions 
observed that “cash balance plans and other account-base defined benefit plan formats are no 
more than retirement-plan design tools, which in themselves are neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’.”58  
This is a useful caveat to keep in mind about teacher pension plans in general.  As we have seen, 
the boundaries among the various types of pensions are porous.  Rather than arguing about 
whether existing arrangements are good or bad, discussions about whether pension reform is 
needed might more usefully begin by seeking agreement on the objectives being sought in a 
retirement benefits program.  Then it would be appropriate to examine various plan types and 
features with an eye on whether existing arrangements or some new combination would best 
meet those objectives.  Where teacher pensions are concerned, this paper has raised some 
questions about objectives that merit re-examination, some arising from the financial pressures 
placed on plan sponsors and some from inequities in the distribution of current plan benefits.  It 
has also offered an initial look at some of the options available for rethinking teacher pension 
design, including one that to date may have received too little attention in the public sector. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-1 
State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
AK 
Alaska 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 60.9 6/30/2005 8.65% 21.00% 6/30/2006 
AL 
Retirement 
Systems of 
Alabama / 
Alabama 
Teachers 
Yes 83.6 9/30/2005 5.00% 8.17% 9/30/2006 
AR 
Arkansas 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 80.3 6/30/2006 
Non-
contributory for 
some 
members; 
those who 
contribute are 
required to 
contribute 6.0% 
14.00% 6/30/2006 
AZ 
Arizona State 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 84.9 6/30/2005 7.40% 7.40% 6/30/2006 
CA 
California 
State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 87 6/30/2006 8.00% 8.25% 6/30/2006 
CO 
Denver Public 
Schools 
Retirement 
System 
No 87.6 1/1/2007 8.00% 14.47% 12/31/2006 
CO 
 
Colorado 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
Association / 
Colorado 
School 
 
No 74.1 12/31/2006 8.00% 10.65% 12/31/2006 
CT 
Connecticut 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Board 
No 63 6/30/2006 
7.0%, including 
1.0% for retiree 
medical 
benefits 
15.28% 6/30/2006 
DC 
 
District of 
Columbia 
Retirement 
Board / DC 
Teachers 
 
No 100 10/1/2006 8.00% 0% 9/30/2006 
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State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
DE 
Delaware 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 103.7% 6/30/2006 
3.0% of 
earnings above 
$6,000 
6.10% 6/30/2007 
FL 
Florida 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 105.6 7/1/2006 non-contributory 6.28% 6/30/2006 
GA 
Georgia 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 96.5 6/30/2006 5.00% 9.28% 6/30/2007 
HI 
Hawaii 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 65 6/30/2006 
Hybrid plan 
participants 
contribute 6.0% 
13.75% 6/30/2006 
IA 
Iowa Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 90.2 6/30/2007 3.70% 5.75% 6/30/2007 
ID 
Idaho Public 
Employee 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 95.2 7/1/2006 6.23% 10.39% 6/30/2006 
IL 
Illinois 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 62 7/1/2006 9.40% 7.64% 6/30/2006 
IL 
Chicago Public 
School 
Teachers 
Pension and 
Retirement 
Fund 
No 78 6/30/2006 9.00% 1.86% 6/30/2006 
IN 
Indiana State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Fund 
Yes 44.3 6/30/2006 3% 13.22% 6/30/2006 
KS 
Kansas Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 69.4 12/31/2006 4.00% 6.77% 6/30/2007 
KY 
Kentucky 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 73.1 6/30/2006 9.855% 13.105% 6/30/2006 
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State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
LA 
Louisiana 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 67.5 6/30/2006 8.00% 15.90% 6/30/2006 
MA 
Massachusetts 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Board 
No 69.6 1/1/2002 
5% to 11%, 
depending on 
member's date 
of entry 
 12/31/2003 
MD 
Maryland State 
Retirement 
and Pension 
System / 
Maryland 
Teachers 
Yes 84.2 6/30/2006 
2.0% for most 
public school 
teachers 
11.17% 6/30/2006 
ME 
Maine Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Maine State 
and Teacher 
No 69.7 6/30/2005 7.65% 17.23% 6/30/2006 
MI 
Michigan 
Public School 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 79.3 9/30/2005 
3.0% of first 
$5,000 of pay, 
plus 3.6% of 
next $10,000, 
plus 4.3% of 
pay above 
$15,000 
7.60% 9/30/2006 
MN 
Minnesota 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Association 
Yes 92.1 6/30/2007 5.00% 9.00% 6/30/2007 
MN 
Duluth 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Fund 
Association 
Yes 84.1 7/1/2006 5.50% 5.79% 6/30/2006 
MN 
St. Paul 
Teachers' 
Retirement 
Fund 
Association 
Yes 69.1 6/30/2006 8.00% 8.33% 6/30/2006 
MO 
Missouri Public 
Schools 
Retirement 
System / 
Missouri 
Teachers 
No 83.5 6/30/2007 12.00% 12.00% 6/30/2007 
39  
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A-1 
State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
MS 
Mississippi 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 73.5 6/30/2006 7.25% 11.30% 6/30/2007 
MT 
Montana 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 76.1 7/1/2006 7.15% 7.58% 6/30/2006 
NC 
North Carolina 
Retirement 
Systems / 
North Carolina 
Teachers and 
State 
Employees 
Yes 106.5 12/31/2005 6.00% 2.66% 6/30/2006 
ND 
North Dakota 
Teachers Fund 
for Retirement 
Yes 75.4 7/1/2006 7.75% 7.75% 6/30/2006 
NE 
Nebraska 
Retirement 
Systems 
Yes 87.2 7/1/2006 7.98% 8.76% 6/30/2006 
NH 
New 
Hampshire 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 61.4 6/30/2005 6.66% 5.81% 6/30/2006 
NJ 
New Jersey 
Division of 
Pension and 
Benefits / New 
Jersey 
Teachers 
Yes 78 6/30/2006 5.00% 1% 6/30/2006 
NM 
 
New Mexico 
Educational 
Retirement 
Board 
 
Yes 68.3 6/30/2006 7.75% 10.15% 6/30/2006 
NV 
 
Nevada Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Nevada 
Regular 
Employees 
 
No 76.5 6/30/2006 
10.31%, paid 
by employers 
for most 
members, in 
lieu of salary 
increases or by 
salary reduction 
as certified by 
employers 
10.31%; most 
employers also 
pay employee 
contributions, in 
lieu of salary 
increases or by 
salary reduction 
6/30/2006 
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State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
NY 
New York City 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 100 6/30/2004 3.0% for first 10 years of service 15.788% 6/30/2005 
NY 
New York 
State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 102.6 6/30/2006 
0% for Tiers 1 
and 2; 3.0% for 
Tiers 3 and 4 
until the 
participant 
accrues 10 
years of service 
8.60% 6/30/2007 
OH 
Ohio State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
No 82.2 6/30/2007 10.00% 
14.0%, 
including 1.0% 
for retiree 
health care 
6/30/2007 
OK 
Oklahoma 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 49.3 6/30/2006 7.00% 13.43% 6/30/2006 
OR 
Oregon 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 110.5 12/31/2006 
non-
contributory for 
the DB plan; 
6.0% for the 
individual 
accounts 
16.97% 6/30/2007 
PA 
 
Pennsylvania 
Public School 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
 
Yes 81.2 6/30/2005 7.50% 6.46% 6/30/2007 
RI 
Rhode Island 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Rhode Island 
ERS 
Yes 55.8 6/30/2004 9.50% 
14.84% for 
teachers 
(slightly less for 
districts not 
participating in 
1990 early 
retirement 
incentive) 
6/30/2005 
SC 
South Carolina 
Retirement 
Systems / 
South Carolina 
RS 
Yes 69.6 7/1/2006 6.50% 8.05% 6/30/2007 
SD 
 
South Dakota 
Retirement 
System 
 
Yes 96.7 6/30/2006 6.00% 6.00% 6/30/2006 
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State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
TN 
Tennessee 
Consolidated 
Retirement 
System / TN 
State and 
Teachers 
Yes 99.8 7/1/2005 5% 6.13% 6/30/2006 
TX 
Teacher 
Retirement 
System of 
Texas 
No 89.2 8/31/2007 
6.9%, which 
includes 0.5% 
for health care 
benefits 
7.98%, which 
includes 1.4% 
for health care 
benefits 
8/31/2007 
UT 
Utah 
Retirement 
Systems 
Yes 96.4 12/31/2006 non-contributory 13.38% 12/31/2006 
VA 
Virginia 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 81.3 6/30/2005 5.00% 6.62% 6/30/2006 
VA 
Educational 
Employees' 
Supplementary 
Retirement 
System of 
Fairfax County 
Yes 84.9 12/31/2005 4.00% 3.37% 6/30/2006 
VT 
Vermont 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 84.6 6/30/2006 3.90% 4.81% 6/30/2006 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement 
Systems / 
Washington 
Teachers Plan 
1 
Yes 77.6 9/30/2005 6.00% 1.37% 6/30/2006 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement 
Systems / 
Washington 
Teachers Plan 
2/3 
Yes 100 9/30/2004 
0.87% for Plan 
2 members; 
Plan 3 
members may 
contribute 5% 
to 15% to the 
defined 
contribution 
plan component 
1.37% 6/30/2006 
WI 
 
Wisconsin 
Retirement 
System 
 
Yes 99.5 12/31/2005 5.00% 4.70% 12/31/2005 
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State Plan Name Social Security 
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
Employee 
Contribution 
Rate 
Employer 
Contribution 
Rate 
for FY 
ended 
WV 
West Virginia 
Consolidated 
Public 
Retirement 
Board / West 
Virginia 
Teachers 
Yes 31.6 6/30/2006 6.00% 24.13% 6/30/2006 
WY 
Wyoming 
Retirement 
System 
Yes 94.4 1/1/2007 5.68% 5.57% 12/31/2006 
 
Source: The Public Fund Survey, available at <http://www.publicfundsurvey.org> accessed on March 27, 2008. 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
AK 
Alaska 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
60/8, any/20 55/8 
automatic, 
based on a % 
of the CPI 
depending on 
retiree's age 
6/30/2006 2% for first 20 years, 2.5% thereafter 
AL 
Retirement 
Systems of 
Alabama / 
Alabama 
Teachers 
any/25, 
60/10 na 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the legislature 
9/30/2006 2.0125% 
AR 
Arkansas 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
any/28, 60/5 any/25 
automatic, 
based on CPI, 
rounded to the 
nearest one-
half of one %, 
with a 3% 
maximum for 
Plan A 
members and 
2% for Plan B; 
simple 
6/30/2006 2.15% 
AZ 
Arizona State 
Retirement 
System 
65/any, 
62/10, Rule 
of 80 
50/5 
based on 
excess 
earnings 
above 8%, up 
to 4% annually
6/30/2006 
2.1% for first 20 
years, 2.15% for 20 to 
25 years, 2.2% for 25 
to 30 years, and 2.3% 
for 30 or more years 
CA 
 
California 
State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
 
60/5 55/5, 50/30 automatic 2% simple 6/30/2006 
2.0%, rising to 2.4% 
at age 63 
CO 
 
Denver Public 
Schools 
Retirement 
System 
 
65/5, 55/25, 
50/30 
any/25, 
55/15 
automatic 
3.25% 
compounded 
12/31/2006 2.5% 
CO 
 
Colorado 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
Association / 
Colorado 
School 
 
50/30, Rule 
of 80 at age 
55, 65/5 
50/25, 
55/20 
automatic 
3.5% 
compounded 
12/31/2006 2.5% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
CT 
Connecticut 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Board 
60/20, 
any/35 
any/25, 
60/10 
for members 
who retired 
before 9/92, 
automatic, 
based on CPI, 
with 3% 
minimum and 
5% max, 
compounded; 
6/30/2006 2% 
DC 
District of 
Columbia 
Retirement 
Board / DC 
Teachers 
62/5, 60/20, 
55/30 
any/25, 
50/20 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
compounded, 
maximum of 
3% for those 
hired after 
November 15, 
1996 
9/30/2006 2% 
DE 
Delaware 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, 60/15, 
any/30 
55/15, 
any/25 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the general 
assembly 
6/30/2007 1.85% 
FL 
Florida 
Retirement 
System 
62/6, any/30 any/6 automatic 3% compounded 6/30/2006 1.60%  
GA 
Georgia 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
60/10, 
any/30 any/25 
automatic 
1.5% every 6 
months as 
long as CPI 
increases, 
compounded 
6/30/2007 2% 
HI 
Hawaii 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, 55/30 
for hybrid 
plan 
55/20 automatic 2.5% simple 6/30/2006 2% 
IA 
Iowa Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
65/any, 
62/20, Rule 
of 88 
55/any 
Non-
guaranteed 
post-
retirement 
payment from 
a reserve 
account 
established 
from excess 
investment 
earnings. 
Calculation 
includes 
factors related 
to num 
6/30/2007 2% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
ID 
Idaho Public 
Employee 
Retirement 
System 
65/5 55/5 
automatic 1% 
compounded 
(as long as 
CPI rises at 
least 1%), plus 
investment-
based 
increase 
6/30/2006 2.0% 
IL 
Illinois 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, 60/10, 
55/35 55/20 
automatic 3% 
compounded 6/30/2006 
2.2% for service after 
7/1/98; for previous 
service: 1.67% for 
first 10 years; 1.9% 
for next ten years, 
2.1% for next ten 
years, and 2.3 % for 
years above 30. 
Members may 
upgrade service 
earned before 7/1/98 
to 2.2% thru service 
purchase 
IL 
Chicago Public 
School 
Teachers 
Pension and 
Retirement 
Fund 
55/20, 62/5 55/20 automatic 3% compounded 6/30/2006 
2.2%; 1.67% for 
service before 7/1/98 
for each of first 10 
years, 1.9% for years 
11-20, 2.1% for years 
21-30, and 2.3% for 
each year above 30. 
Svc earned before 
7/1/98 can be 
upgraded to 2.2% 
thru higher ee 
contributions 
IN 
 
Indiana State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Fund 
 
65/10, 
60/15, Rule 
of 85 at age 
55 
50/15 ad hoc 6/30/2006 1.1% plus a DC component 
KS 
 
 
 
Kansas Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
 
 
65/any, 
62/10, Rule 
of 85 
55/10 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the legislature 
6/30/2007 1.75% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
KY 
Kentucky 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
60/27, 55/5 55/5 
automatic 
1.5% 
compounded 
6/30/2006 
2.5%, 3.0% if the 
member retires with 
30 years of service; 
members joining after 
6/30/02 who accrue 
less than 10 yrs of 
service receive 2.0% 
LA 
Louisiana 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
60/5, 55/25, 
any/30 
60/5, 
any/20 
based on 
investment 
return 
6/30/2006 2.5% 
MA 
Massachusetts 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Board 
65/10, 
any/20 55/10 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the legislature; 
based on CPI 
up to 3% for 
first $12,000 
of benefit; 
compounded 
12/31/2003 
2.5%; teachers who 
elected into 
RetirementPlus and 
have 30 or more 
years of service 
receive an additional 
2% for each year of 
service above 24 
MD 
Maryland State 
Retirement 
and Pension 
System / 
Maryland 
Teachers 
any/30, 
62/5, 63/4, 
64/3, 65/2 
55/15 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
up to 3%, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 
larger of: 1) 1.2% of 
FAS for service prior 
to 6/30/98; 2) 0.8% 
FAS up to SSIL* plus 
1.5% FAS above that 
level for service prior 
to 6/30/98; 3) 1.4% 
FAS after 6/30/98 
ME 
Maine Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Maine State 
and Teacher 
60/5, 62/5, 
62/10 any/25 
automatic, 
based on CPI 
up to 4%, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 2% 
MI 
Michigan 
Public School 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
any/30, 
60/10 55/15 
automatic 3% 
simple 9/30/2006 1.5% 
MN 
Minnesota 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Association 
Upon 
attaining 
normal 
Social 
Security 
retirement 
age, not to 
exceed 66 
55/3 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
compounded, 
up to 2.5%, 
plus an 
increase 
based on 
investment 
performance 
6/30/2007 1.7% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
MN 
Duluth 
Teachers 
Retirement 
Fund 
Association 
Same as 
age of 
eligibility for 
full Social 
Security 
benefits, not 
to exceed 
age 66 
55/3 
automatic 2% 
compounded, 
plus a share of 
investment 
earnings when 
the portfolio 
returns 
exceed 8.5% 
6/30/2006 1.7% 
MN 
St. Paul 
Teachers' 
Retirement 
Fund 
Association 
65/3 55/3 
automatic 
2.0% plus an 
excess 
investment 
earnings 
component 
6/30/2006 1.7% 
MO 
Missouri Public 
Schools 
Retirement 
System / 
Missouri 
Teachers 
60/5, 
any/30, 
Rule of 80 
55/5, 
any/25 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
not to exceed 
5%, 
compounded, 
with a lifetime 
cap of 80% 
6/30/2007 2.5%; 2.55% for 31 or more years of service 
MS 
Mississippi 
Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
60/4, any/25 none automatic 3% compounded 6/30/2007 
2.0% for the first 25 
years and 2.5% for 
each year thereafter 
MT 
Montana 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
any/25, 60/5 50/5 
automatic 
1.5% 
compounded 
beginning 3 
years after 
onset of 
annuity 
6/30/2006 1.667% 
NC 
North Carolina 
Retirement 
Systems / 
North Carolina 
Teachers and 
State 
Employees 
65/5, 60/25, 
any/30 60/5, 50/20 ad hoc 6/30/2006 1.82% 
ND 
North Dakota 
Teachers Fund 
for Retirement 
65/3, Rule 
of 85 55/3 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the legislature 
6/30/2006 2% 
NE 
 
Nebraska 
Retirement 
Systems 
 
65/5, Rule 
of 85, 
any/35 
60/5 
based on CPI, 
up to 2.5%, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 2% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
NH 
New 
Hampshire 
Retirement 
System 
60/any 
Rule of 70 
with 20 
years of 
service or 
age 50 with 
10 years of 
service 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the 
legislature's 
fiscal 
committee 
6/30/2006 
1.67% prior to age 
65, 1.5% after 
attaining age 65 
NJ 
 
New Jersey 
Division of 
Pension and 
Benefits / New 
Jersey 
Teachers 
 
60/10 any/25 
automatic 
60% of CPI, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 1/55 for each year of service (1.818%) 
NM 
New Mexico 
Educational 
Retirement 
Board 
65/5, 
any/25, 
Rule of 75 
at age 60 
Rule of 75 
 
One-half of 
CPI up to 4%, 
with a 2% 
minimum; 
annuitant must 
be 65 years of 
age to qualify 
for a COLA 
 
6/30/2006 2.35% 
NV 
Nevada Public 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Nevada 
Regular 
Employees 
65/5, 60/10, 
any/30 
Participants 
may retire 
at any time 
 
after 3 years 
of receiving 
benefits, auto 
2% annually, 
rising 
gradually to 
5% annually, 
compounded, 
after 14 years 
of benefits 
 
6/30/2006 
2.5% for svc earned 
before 7/1/01 and 
2.67% for svc earned 
thereafter 
NY 
New York City 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, 55/30 55/5 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
up to 3%, 
compounded 
6/30/2005 
1.67% if service is 
less than 20 years, 
2.0% if service is 20 
or more years, and 
1.5% for each year 
above 30 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
NY 
New York 
State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, 55/30 55/5 
 
automatic, 
equal to half 
the CPI, with a 
minimum of 
1% and a 
maximum of 
3%, 
compounded, 
applied to the 
first $18,000 in 
annual 
benefits 
 
6/30/2007 
2% up to 30 years 
(1.67%) if less than 
20 years), plus 1.5% 
for each year above 
30 
OH 
 
Ohio State 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
 
65/30 any/30, 55/25, 60/5 
automatic 3% 
simple 6/30/2007 
 
2.2% up to 30 years; 
for each year above 
30, formula rises by 
0.1% per year, 
beginning with 2.2% 
for year 31, not to 
exceed 100% of final 
average salary; the 
Combined Plan factor 
is 1.0% 
 
OK 
Oklahoma 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
62/5, Rule 
of 90; 
members 
who joined 
before 
7/1/92 
qualify for 
the Rule of 
80 
55/5 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the legislature 
6/30/2006 2% 
OR 
 
Oregon 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
 
60/5 50/5 
based on CPI, 
compounded, 
up to 2% 
6/30/2007 1.67% 
PA 
 
 
Pennsylvania 
Public School 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
 
 
62/1, 60/30, 
any/35 55/25 
ad hoc as 
approved by 
the general 
assembly 
6/30/2007 2.5% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
RI 
Rhode Island 
Employees 
Retirement 
System / 
Rhode Island 
ERS 
65/10, 
59/29 55/20 
based on CPI, 
up to 3%, 
compounded; 
effective after 
3rd 
anniversary of 
retirement 
6/30/2005 
1.6% for first 10 yrs, 
1.8% for yrs 11-20, 
2.0% for yrs 21-25, 
2.25% for yrs 26-30, 
2.5% for yrs 31-37, 
2.25% for yr 38 
SC 
South Carolina 
Retirement 
Systems / 
South Carolina 
RS 
65/5, any/28 60/5, 55/25 
automatic one 
percent 
compounded 
6/30/2007 1.82% 
SD 
South Dakota 
Retirement 
System 
65/3, Rule 
of 85; 55/3 55/3; 
automatic 
3.1% 
compounded 
6/30/2006 
Higher of Enhanced 
Benefit, which is 
1.625% for svc before 
7/1/02 plus Base 
Benefit: 1.55% for svc 
after 7/1/02 ; or 
Alternate Benefit--see 
SDRS website for 
details 
TN 
Tennessee 
Consolidated 
Retirement 
System / TN 
State and 
Teachers 
60/5, any/30 55/5, any/25 
automatic 
based on CPI, 
up to 3% 
compounded 
6/30/2006 1.5% plus .25% of FAS over SSIL 
TX 
Teacher 
Retirement 
System of 
Texas 
65/5, Rule 
of 80 55/5, 50/30 
ad hoc, as 
approved by 
the legislature 
8/31/2007 2.3% 
UT 
Utah 
Retirement 
Systems 
any/30, 65/4 
any/25, 
60/20, 
62/10 
automatic 
based on CPI 
up to 3% 
simple 
12/31/2006 2% 
VA 
Virginia 
Retirement 
System 
65/5, 50/30 50/10, 55/5 
automatic 
based on CPI 
up to 5% 
6/30/2006 1.7% 
VA 
Educational 
Employees' 
Supplementary 
Retirement 
System of 
Fairfax County 
60/5, any/30 na automatic 3% compounded 6/30/2006 .8% 
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State Plan Name 
Normal 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Early 
Retirement 
(age/svc) 
Post-
Retirement 
Increase 
Provisions 
for FY 
ended Benefit Factor 
VT 
Vermont 
Teachers 
Retirement 
System 
62/any, 
any/30 55/5 
automatic 
based on one-
half of CPI, up 
to 5%, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 1.67% up to 50% of FAS 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement 
Systems / 
Washington 
Teachers Plan 
1 
any/30, 
60/5, 55/25   6/30/2006 2% 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement 
Systems / 
Washington 
Teachers Plan 
2/3 
65/any 
55/20 for 
Plan 2; 
55/10 for 
Plan 3; 
55/30 for 
either plan 
with a 3% 
per year 
discount 
automatic 
based on CPI 
up to 3%, 
compounded 
6/30/2006 
2.0% for Plan 2 
members; 1.0% for 
Plan 3 
WI 
Wisconsin 
Retirement 
System 
65/any 55/any 
based on 
investment 
returns 
12/31/2005 1.6%; 1.765% for service before 2000 
WV 
West Virginia 
Consolidated 
Public 
Retirement 
Board / West 
Virginia 
Teachers 
60/5, 55/30, 
any/35   6/30/2006 2% 
WY 
Wyoming 
Retirement 
System 
60/4, Rule 
of 85 
50/4; 
any/25 
Automatic, 
lesser of 3% 
or the 
increase in the 
cost of living 
as determined 
by the board, 
effective each 
July 1 after 
two full years 
of retirement 
12/31/2006 
2.125% for first 15 
years, 2.25% for each 
year of service 
thereafter 
 
Source: The Public Fund Survey, available at <http://www.publicfundsurvey.org> accessed on March 27, 2008. 
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State Plan Name 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Method 
Investment 
Return 
Assumption 
Inflation 
Assumption 
Assumed 
Real Rate 
of Return 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
AK Alaska Teachers Retirement System PUC 8.25% 3.50% 4.75% 6/30/2005 
AL 
Retirement Systems 
of Alabama / 
Alabama Teachers  
Entry age 8.00% 4.50% 3.50% 9/30/2005 
AR Arkansas Teachers 
Retirement System 
Entry Age 8.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6/30/2007 
AZ Arizona State Retirement System PUC 8.00% 4.25% 3.75% 6/30/2005 
CA 
California State 
Teachers Retirement 
System 
Entry age 8.00% 3.25% 4.75% 6/30/2006 
CO 
Denver Public 
Schools Retirement 
System 
Entry age 8.50% 4.50% 4.00% 1/1/2007 
CO 
Colorado Public 
Employees 
Retirement Assn. / 
Colorado School 
Entry age 8.50% 3.75% 4.75% 12/31/2006 
CT 
Connecticut 
Teachers Retirement 
Board 
Entry age 8.50% 4.00% 4.50% 6/30/2006 
DC 
District of Columbia 
Retirement Board / 
DC Teachers  
Aggregate 
cost 7.25% 5.00% 2.25% 10/1/2006 
DE 
Delaware Public 
Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry age 8.00% 3.75% 4.25% 6/30/2007 
FL Florida Retirement System Entry age 7.75% 3.00% 4.75% 7/1/2007 
GA Georgia Teachers Retirement System Entry age 7.50% 3.75% 3.75% 6/30/2006 
HI Hawaii Employees Retirement System Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
IA 
Iowa Public 
Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry age 7.50% 3.50% 4.00% 6/30/2007 
ID 
Idaho Public 
Employee 
Retirement System 
Entry age 7.75% 3.75% 4.00% 7/1/2007 
IL Illinois Teachers Retirement System PUC 8.50% 3.50% 5.00% 7/1/2006 
IL 
Chicago Public 
School Teachers 
Pension and 
Retirement Fund 
PUC 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
IN 
Indiana State 
Teachers Retirement 
Fund 
Entry age 7.50% 4.50% 3.00% 6/30/2006 
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Investment 
Return 
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Inflation 
Assumption 
Assumed 
Real Rate 
of Return 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
KS 
Kansas Public 
Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry Age 
Normal 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 12/31/2006 
KY Kentucky Teachers Retirement System PUC 7.50% 4.00% 3.50% 6/30/2006 
LA Louisiana Teachers Retirement System PUC 8.25% 3.20% 5.05% 6/30/2006 
MA 
Massachusetts 
Teachers Retirement 
Board 
Entry age 8.25% 3.50% 4.75% 1/1/2002 
MD 
Maryland State 
Retirement and 
Pension System / 
Maryland Teachers  
Entry Age 7.75% 4.00% 3.75% 6/30/2006 
ME 
Maine Public 
Employees 
Retirement System / 
Maine State and 
Teacher  
Entry age 7.75% 4.50% 3.25% 6/30/2005 
MI 
Michigan Public 
School Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry age 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 9/30/2005 
MN 
Minnesota Teachers 
Retirement 
Association 
Entry age 8.50% 5.00% 3.50% 6/30/2007 
MN 
Duluth Teachers 
Retirement Fund 
Association 
Entry age 8.50% 5.00% 3.50% 7/1/2006 
MN 
St. Paul Teachers' 
Retirement Fund 
Association 
Entry age 8.50% 5.00% 3.50% 6/30/2006 
MO 
Missouri Public 
Schools Retirement 
System / Missouri 
Teachers 
Entry age 8.00% 3.25% 4.75% 6/30/2007 
MS 
Mississippi Public 
Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry age 8.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6/30/2007 
MT Montana Teachers Retirement System Entry age 7.75% 3.50% 4.25% 7/1/2006 
NC 
North Carolina 
Retirement Systems 
/ North Carolina 
Teachers and State 
Employees 
Entry age 7.25% 3.75% 3.50% 12/31/2005 
ND 
North Dakota 
Teachers Fund for 
Retirement 
Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 7/1/2006 
NE Nebraska Retirement Systems Entry age 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 7/1/2006 
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Actuarial 
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Investment 
Return 
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Inflation 
Assumption 
Assumed 
Real Rate 
of Return 
Actuarial 
Valuation 
Date 
NH New Hampshire 
Retirement System 
Open 
group agg 8.50% 3.50% 5.00% 6/30/2005 
NJ 
New Jersey Division 
of Pension and 
Benefits / New 
Jersey Teachers 
PUC 8.25% 3.00% 5.25% 6/30/2006 
NM 
New Mexico 
Educational 
Retirement Board 
Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
NV 
Nevada Public 
Employees 
Retirement System / 
Nevada Regular 
Employees 
Entry age 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 6/30/2006 
NY 
New York City 
Teachers Retirement 
System 
Frozen 
Initial 
Liability 
8.00% 2.50% 5.50% 6/30/2004 
NY 
New York State 
Teachers Retirement 
System 
Aggregate 
cost 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
OH Ohio State Teachers Retirement System Entry age 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 6/30/2007 
OK Oklahoma Teachers Retirement System Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
OR Oregon Employees Retirement System 
Project 
Unit Credit 8.00% 2.75% 5.25% 12/31/2006 
PA 
Pennsylvania Public 
School Employees 
Retirement System 
Entry age 8.50% 3.25% 5.25% 6/30/2006 
RI 
Rhode Island 
Employees 
Retirement System / 
Rhode Island ERS 
Entry age 8.25% 3.00% 5.25% 6/30/2004 
SC 
South Carolina 
Retirement Systems 
/ South Carolina RS 
Entry age 7.25% 3.00% 4.25% 7/1/2006 
SD South Dakota Retirement System Entry age 7.75% 4.00% 3.75% 6/30/2006 
TN 
Tennessee 
Consolidated 
Retirement System / 
TN State and 
Teachers  
Frozen 
Entry Age 7.50% 0.00% n/a 7/1/2005 
TX Teacher Retirement System of Texas Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 8/31/2007 
UT Utah Retirement 
Systems 
Entry Age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 12/31/2006 
VA Virginia Retirement System Entry age 7.50% 2.50% 5.00% 6/30/2006 
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Real Rate 
of Return 
Actuarial 
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Date 
VA 
Educational 
Employees' 
Supplementary 
Retirement System 
of Fairfax County 
Entry age 7.50% 3.75% 3.75% 12/31/2005 
VT Vermont Teachers 
Retirement System 
Entry age 
frozen 8.25% 3.00% 5.25% 6/30/2006 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement Systems 
/ Washington 
Teachers Plan 1 
Frozen 
initial 
liability 
8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 9/30/2005 
WA 
Washington 
Department of 
Retirement Systems 
/ Washington 
Teachers Plan 2/3 
Aggregate 
cost 8.00% 3.50% 4.50% 9/30/2004 
WI Wisconsin Retirement System 
Frozen 
Entry Age 7.80% 4.10% 3.70% 12/31/2005 
WV 
West Virginia 
Consolidated Public 
Retirement Board / 
West Virginia 
Teachers 
Entry age 7.50% 3.00% 4.50% 6/30/2006 
WY Wyoming Retirement System Entry age 8.00% 3.00% 5.00% 1/1/2007 
 
Source: The Public Fund Survey, available at <http://www.publicfundsurvey.org> accessed on March 27, 2008. 
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